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1 Introduction 
The last two decades have seen significant internationalization of firms from developing 
economies, in terms of their greater participation in international trade, growing outflows 
of foreign direct investment (FDI), and a recent surge in their cross-border mergers and 
acquisition activity. Outward investment from developing countries is not a new 
phenomenon but in recent years there has been a marked increase in the magnitude of 
flows and a qualitative transformation in their pattern. Flows of outward FDI from 
developing countries rose from about $6 billion in 1989-91 (about 2.7% of global 
outward flows) to $253 billion for 2007 (nearly 13% of global outflows).1 The stock of 
outward FDI from developing countries rose from around $145 billion in 1990 to $2,288 
billion in 2007 (about 8% of global stock of FDI in 1990 to 14.6% of global stock in 
2007).2  
Within this broad trend, the growing internationalization of firms from two fast-
growing developing countries, China and India, is particularly notable. Exports have been 
a central feature of the growth of the Chinese economy over the last three decades and, 
more recently, they have made a visible contribution to Indian growth too. Outward FDI 
from China and India has grown rapidly in recent years, and firms from these two 
countries are increasingly involved in overseas mergers and acquisitions.3 
Morck et al (2008) provide a summary of outward FDI from China. Outward FDI 
flows from China were around $22.5 billion in 2007; the stock of Chinese outward FDI 
grew steadily, from $4.5 billion in 1990 to $96 billion in 2007.4 A significant chunk of 
                         
1 See World Investment Report 2008, Annex Table A.I.8 and Table B.1. In terms of its sectoral 
distribution, in 2004-06, around 70% of outward FDI flows from developing countries were in 
the services sector (within which business services, finance, and trade were the leading 
categories), with manufacturing accounting for 13% and the primary sector accounting for 
around 8%. 
2 See World Investment Report 2008, Annex Table B.2.  
3 Aggregate statistics apart, many of the firms aggressively on the path of internationalization are 
from China and India. For instance, two-thirds of the 100 firms identified as ‘new global 
challengers’ in a recent Boston Consulting Group (2006) report are Chinese or Indian.  
4 See World Investment Report 2008, Annex Tables B.1 and B.2. When referring to China, we ignore 
values recorded under Hong Kong (China) and Taiwan (China). FDI outflows from China and 
India seem small compared to developing-country totals, but this is in part because statistically 
recorded totals are dominated by a handful of countries, notably Hong Kong (China) and a few 
offshore financial centres. 
3 
Chinese outward FDI has gone to tax havens and to Southeast Asia, but recently a 
substantial amount has flowed to Africa too. Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have 
become a new channel for outward FDI, with the China Investment Corporation, 
established in 2007, playing a significant role. Chinese overseas investment have focused 
on oil and petroleum (with China National Petrol Corporation and China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation leading the charge), but there have been significant 
investments in construction (China State Construction Corporation), shipping (China 
Shipping), telecoms (China Mobile and China Telecom) and steel (Shanghai Baosteel) 
too. Much of the outward investment from China is carried out by large state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). 
Nayyar (2008) describes outward FDI from India, whose flows grew from negligible 
levels in 1990 to $13.6 billion in 2007, and stock rose from $0.1 billion in 1990 to $29 
billion by 2007.5 Outward FDI from India has spanned investments in a broad range of 
sectors, including steel, pharmaceuticals, information technology and services, as well as 
food and beverages. India’s Oil and Natural Gas Commission has made substantial 
investment in oil and energy; Indian conglomerates such as the Tata group have made 
overseas acquisitions in automobiles (acquiring Jaguar in the UK) and steel (the Anglo-
Dutch firm Corus); Ranbaxy has made global forays in pharmaceuticals and Infosys in 
information technology and business processing. 
Firms from China and India have been involved in significant and growing levels of 
mergers and acquisitions abroad. Over the period 2005-07, cross-border purchases by 
Chinese firms average about $3.5 billion per annum, while those by Indian firms 
averaged $1.5 billion per annum. To the extent M&A activity is financed with funds 
raised in international markets or in the host economy the acquisitions are not fully 
recorded in measured FDI outflows. Hence measures of outward FDI probably 
underestimate the extent of internationalization of firms from these two countries. 
The patterns of internationalization of Chinese and Indian firms suggest some 
common elements. Both countries have experienced rapid growth in recent decades, 
which led to large inflows of FDI and portfolio capital. These inflows, combined with 
high rates of domestic saving, created large reserves of capital at the macroeconomic 
                         
5 See World Investment Report 2008, Annex Tables B.1 and B.2. 
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level, which in turn led to relaxation of policy restrictions on capital outflows. Policy 
regimes that had previously prohibited capital outflows at the corporate level became 
increasingly permissive. Much of the recent outflows took place within the context of 
easy credit conditions in global financial markets, though this situation has changed 
dramatically since the summer of 2007. 
These similarities should not mask the important differences in the patterns of 
internationalization of Chinese and Indian firms. While Chinese overseas acquisitions are 
more commonly carried out by state-owned enterprises, Indian outward FDI involves 
mostly private-sector firms, typically the large, diversified, business houses. Chinese 
overseas investments are more likely to have been in primary sectors, notably minerals 
and energy, while Indian investments are more distributed across a range of sectors, 
including steel and pharmaceuticals at one end to information technology and business 
services at the other.  
These differences are probably related to differences in the policy environment that 
have guided the industrial evolution in these economies. Despite the economic 
liberalization that started in China in the 1980s, state-owned enterprises continue to play 
an important part in the Chinese industrial sector. Given the dependence of the economy 
on sustained exports, many of the Chinese overseas investments aim to secure access to 
critical raw materials, especially energy. India’s industrial sectors, in contrast, went 
through many policy gyrations. India was remarkably open to inward FDI all through the 
1950s, allowing a substantial stock of foreign capital to build up. Through much of the 
1960s the policy of import-substituting industrialization allowed considerable scope for 
private enterprise, creating a significant pool of private firms. Economic liberalization in 
the last two decades allowed a cadre of professionally-run Indian firms to emerge in skill-
intensive sectors such as information technology and pharmaceuticals, and these have 
firms have been particularly active in overseas markets.  
However, these trends towards growing internationalization of China and India must 
be kept in perspective. Even as outward FDI has grown for both countries, the flows 
remain paltry relative to the size of these economies and relative to global FDI flows. 
Outward FDI flows as fractions of gross fixed capital formation were only 1.6% for 
China and 3.5% for India for the year 2007. Compare these to 6.4% for the developing 
countries as a whole and 16.2 for the corresponding global ratio. Outward FDI stock as a 
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share of annual GDP was 3% for China and 2.6% for India in the year 2007. The 
corresponding value for all developing countries was 16% and for the world economy 
was 29%.6  
So why have these fledgling flows commanded so much attention? For one, both 
China and India are large and populous developing countries and their recent growth 
spurt has captured the popular imagination. Further, the emerging outward orientation of 
these countries reflects a distinct break from their historical trajectories – both China and 
India were inward-looking economies for much of the post-War period, and recent 
trends may presage their arrival on the international scene. 
The newfound outward orientation is notable for some its qualitative aspects too, of 
which two stand out in particular. One, the time profile of flow of FDI does not 
conform to the conventional predictions of the ‘investment development path’ taken by 
developing countries. Traditional theories envisage developing countries graduating 
through various stages, starting from a stage where inward FDI allows domestic firms to 
acquire technology and other manufacturing capabilities, then graduating to a stage where 
domestic industrial capability allows these firms to export their output, only eventually 
investing overseas, and typically only in economies lower down in the stage of 
development. By design of their economic regimes, both China and India developed their 
industrial bases through policies of import-substitution without recourse to massive 
inflows of FDI in the early stages. And for both countries, outward FDI flows have 
emerged much sooner than expected, whether compared to the trajectory of early 
industrializing nations or more recent industrializers such as South Korea. Two, some of 
the capital outflows and acquisitions have been to developed economies rather than, as is 
often expected, to less developed economies. Tata, the large business conglomerate from 
India, has made high profile investments in the UK, while China’s Lenovo and Haier 
have made substantial inroads in the US. 
At one level, the outward flow of capital from developing countries to acquire assets 
in developed countries presents a conundrum. Ordinarily, we should expect the rate of 
return on capital to be higher for investments in a fast-growing developing economy 
rather than for overseas ventures in industrially-advanced economies. To put it simply, 
                         
6 See World Investment Report 2008. Both countries also rank quite low in terms of UNCTAD’s 
outward FDI performance index, which measures a country’s outward FDI relative to its GDP. 
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the ‘uphill flow’ of capital from labour-rich developing countries to the developed world 
does not fit textbook economic theory.  
One possible explanation is contextual. Liberalization may have given firms an 
opportunity to diversify their real investment portfolios. The logic of diversification may 
make it rational for a firm to expand overseas even when the return on such investment 
is lower, as long as returns domestically and overseas are less than perfectly correlated. 
The Indian firms that have led the internationalization process are those that were well 
diversified across domestic industrial sectors: consider the Tata group, whose interests 
range from manufacturing steel to food & beverages, and running hotels to business 
process outsourcing. In the past, regulatory constraints on diversification abroad often 
compelled these firms to diversify domestically, beyond levels that can be explained by 
technological economies of scope. Once policy becomes suitably accommodating to 
outward FDI, international diversification followed quite naturally. In many cases the 
firms’ quest for economies of scale also motivate them to invest abroad. This is 
particularly true in sectors such as steel and metals. 
At the same time, some of the overseas investments may have been prompted by 
‘push factors’: policies that distort the rates of return on capital at the enterprise level 
create an imperative to venture abroad. In China, distortions in the financial 
intermediation process, combined with a high rate of private savings may have driven 
down the rate of return on domestic investments, forcing firms to look overseas for 
more lucrative opportunities. As Morck et al (2008) put it, “China’s recent outward FDI 
surge is probably a manifestation of its inability to reinvest its high corporate and 
individual savings efficiently.”  
 
2. Motivations 
While a more permissive economic regime is necessary for firms to venture abroad, it is 
not sufficient. What, then, motivates firms to invest overseas? A leading theoretical 
approach, the so-called ownership-location-internalization (OLI) theory, explains the 
internationalization activity of multinational corporations (MNCs) as their attempts to 
extend their ownership advantages (e.g., proprietary access to a superior production 
technology or a valuable brand) to overseas markets by exploiting locational advantages 
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(locating abroad to access low cost inputs or better serve local markets), and internalising 
the efficiency gains from economies of scale and scope by integrating the firm’s activities 
across borders. In short, FDI enables firms to exploit their existing firm-specific assets. 
This standard explanation has limited traction when analysing the internationalization 
activity of MNCs from developing countries. Typically, these firms have only limited 
technological or ownership advantages to exploit.  
Rather, the internationalization activity of firms from developing countries may reflect 
attempts to acquire strategic assets, such as new technologies and brands, and to gain 
secure access to raw materials and to distribution networks. In sum, rather than 
exploiting existing assets, FDI may reflect attempts to acquire or augment these assets. In 
principle technological assets can be acquired through arms length contracts such as 
licensing, or generated through domestic R&D, but market imperfections may imply that 
acquisition is more effective through FDI. For instance, Child and Rodrigues (2008) have 
argued that Chinese firms have internationalized not so much to exploit competitive 
advantages, but to address the competitive disadvantages incurred by operating in 
exclusively domestic markets. 
The linkage, leverage and learning model developed by Matthews (2006) aims to capture 
the idea that ‘latecomer firms’ will use their overseas investments and global linkages to 
leverage their existing cost advantage and learn about new sources of competitive 
advantage. If so, internationalisation may contribute to the building of ownership 
advantages rather than merely being an outcome of existing advantages. This is not 
necessarily reversing received wisdom: empirical research has found that the relationship 
between ownership advantages and outward FDI is often weak (see, for instance, 
Belderbos and Sleuwaegen, 1996). One may also argue that the rationale for vertical FDI 
is similar to that of vertical integration: securing stable supply, avoiding coordination 
problems and reducing transaction costs – this does not need ownership advantages in 
the form of proprietary assets.  
Kumar (2008) has argued that the term ownership advantage should be enlarged to 
include the specific capabilities of developing country firms. Some firms from India and 
China have acquired a niche in ‘frugal engineering’ – the ability to manufacture low cost 
versions of goods for mass markets. Some Indian firms may have developed skills in 
managing multi-plant operations across regions that are heterogeneous in their ethnic, 
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linguistic and cultural makeup. It could even be that forms of corporate governance 
forged to cope with restrictive regulatory regimes in domestic economies may have 
endowed Indian and Chinese firms with a resilience that proves a comparative advantage 
in alien markets with weak legal institutions and insecure property rights.7,8  
What, then, are the proximate reasons for firms from China and India to venture 
abroad, and what factors have enabled them to do so with any degree of success? One 
important fact is to gain access or proximity to overseas markets. In a major survey of 
transnational corporations from developing countries carried out by UNCTAD, a 
majority of firms from China and India reported seeking overseas markets a major 
motivation for investing abroad. While Chinese manufacturing firms can gain access to 
international markets through exports, in some cases overseas investments are a means 
of improving access to markets or pre-emptively securing access against potential 
protectionist barriers. Similarly, Indian IT firms report proximity to potential clients as an 
important reason for investing abroad. 
 A second motivation for firms to invest abroad is to secure access to resources, 
especially natural resources and raw materials. As security of access to essential raw 
materials is considered important for economic growth, state-owned enterprises have 
been at the forefront of acquiring ownership stakes in overseas mining and energy 
sectors. China National Petrol Corporation and China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation are typical firms in this category, but also India’s Oil and Natural Gas 
Commission has made substantial forays abroad. 
Some investments are technology-seeking in intent. Of course, the use of foreign 
investment as a technology-acquisition strategy is not peculiar to China and India: 
Korean firms such as Samsung and Hyundai combined foreign investment with 
international technology licensing to build their technological capabilities.9 However, the 
                         
7 Morck et al (2008) point out that when the Canadian-owned PetroKazakhstan exited from 
Kazakhstan due to its inability to enforce its contractual dues, China National Petroleum 
Corporation acquired its assets and subsequently was far more successful in enforcement. 
8 In fact, more contemporary forms of the OLI theory recognize that investment may be 
motivated by the search for strategic assets in the form of technology, market access, and even the 
desire to access a particular institutional context: see Dunning and Lundan (2008) for an 
elaboration of the argument, and Dunning and Lundan (2009) for an attempt to study Lenovo-
IBM as an example of such an institutional hybrid. 
9 See Lee and Slater (2007) and Matthews (2006) for an elaboration of this point.  
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stronger IPR regimes that have emerged in recent years could have created a bias towards 
technology-seeking overseas acquisitions rather than arms-length technology acquisitions. 
In part this is so because ownership of technology assets allows more experimentation. 
Technology is an important element in the internationalization of Indian pharmaceutical 
and software companies. In many cases this is complemented with the desire to acquire 
brands and distribution networks, which can better appropriate returns to technology 
investments: Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM assets and Haier’s investments in the US 
provide examples. Notably, some Chinese firms have tried to use their toeholds in 
overseas markets to develop their own brand identity. In some sectors, such as Indian 
firms’ investments in steel, overseas acquisitions may enable firms to exploit economies 
of scale and scope. In that sense, some overseas investment may be efficiency seeking. 
Some explanations of increased internationalization fall outside the above categories. 
For some firms the rush to go overseas is fuelled by the desire to steal a march over 
domestic rivals: there appears to be a strong competitive element in overseas acquisition 
strategies of Indian business houses.10 In other cases, outward FDI is seen as a part of a 
‘national strategy’, but this is probably exaggerated and captures the anxiety of some in 
recipient economies. 
Somewhat distinct from the motivations that lead firms to venture abroad, there is the 
question of the business strategies that internationalizing firms adopt. The choice of ‘how 
to internationalize’ is likely to depend on the modes of internationalisation available 
(often directly determined by policy restrictions on forms of outward and inward FDI) 
and the competitive environment the firm faces in the global market. In addition, 
Ramamurti and Singh (2009) argue that the stage of internationalisation may also matter, 
pointing out that the existing literature in international business strategy has very little to 
say about the early internationalisation strategies of firms.   
 
3. Studying the Internationalization of Chinese and Indian Firms 
Some recent research offers insights into the pattern of internationlization of firms from 
China and India, and the strategies adopted by these firms on their path to 
internationalization. 
                         
10 An early version of this argument was made by Stephen Hymer. 
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Fortanier and van Tulder (2008) compare the pattern of international expansion of 
large firms from China and India with those from developed countries. They examine the 
level, pace, variability, and temporal concentration of internationalization activity of 256 
large firms over the period 1990 to 2004. They find that Chinese and Indian firms in 
their sample have internationalised more rapidly and more recently so have a more 
volatile trajectory of internationalization relative to developed country firms. 
Significantly, they also conclude that Chinese and Indian firms are not as 
internationalized as sometimes thought: much of their capital assets and sales remains 
located in their domestic economies. They find that the sectoral distribution of 
internationalization activity for the two categories – developed country firms vs firms 
from China and India – shows limited overlap. Some sectors, such as food & beverages 
and retail distribution are largely the preserve of developed country multinationals. 
Others such as steel, materials, shipping and construction have seen a surge of 
internationalization activity by Chinese and Indian firms. Both developed and developing 
country multinationals are active in sectors such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, oil 
and petroleum, and telecommunications. 
Kumar and Chadha (2008) examine the recent evolution of steel industry in China and 
India. Unlike many developed countries where stagnant or declining demand for steel has 
forced the exit of many manufacturing firms, the demand for steel is buoyant in China 
and India. Large scale investment in steel manufacturing was a common feature of early 
industrialization in both countries allowing firms to develop the necessary expertise. A 
more liberal regime towards outward FDI has allowed Chinese and Indian firms to 
venture overseas, both in the form of greenfield investments and acquisitions. However 
they find crucial differences in the underlying motivation across the two countries: 
Chinese outward FDI aims predominantly to secure access to raw materials for 
expanding domestic steel production, with very few international production operations. 
In contrast, Indian steel firms have ventured abroad to seek markets and strategic assets, 
both to exploit economies of scale and economies of scope across steel–dependent 
manufacturing sectors such as automobiles. In the Chinese case, state-owned enterprises 
have been most active abroad, while in India private sector firms have led the drive to 
internationalization (the Indian public sector steel monolith, SAIL, has been noticeably 
inward–looking). 
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Niosi and Tschang (2008) compares the trajectories adopted by Chinese and Indian 
firms in the software industry. They conclude that the internationalization process differs 
for Chinese and Indian MNEs, but these are related to the different sub-sectors they 
have chosen to operate in. Chinese software firms have focused on their domestic 
market by working with foreign MNCs and focusing on regional markets in Japan 
Taiwan and Korea, while Indian firms continue to expand overseas using a customised-
services model shaped by the US market. In both cases greenfield investments have been 
the dominant form of investment, although acquisitions have increased in importance for 
Indian firms in recent years. Both Chinese and Indian firms have found it easier to grow 
and internationalise in small niches that lack competition from US and European firms- 
outsourcing services and the use of the kanji font. In cases where competition has been 
more head-on – e.g. software products for the finance sector -- the success of Indian and 
Chinese firms has been less assured. 
Athreye and Godley (2008) compare strategies adopted by firms at the early stages of 
their internationalization. They demonstrate that there are many similarities in the 
leapfrogging strategies adopted by US pharmaceutical firms in the 1930s, at the cusp of 
the antibiotics revolution, with the current strategies adopted by Indian pharmaceutical 
firms. Both groups used internationalisation as a strategy to gain a technological edge and 
to acquire firm-specific advantages but the paper emphasizes the significant role played 
by international acquisitions in the Indian case. They speculate that this difference might 
be explained by the larger technological gap faced by Indian firms and the climate of 
stronger intellectual property protection which is likely to favour acquisitions. Their 
paper also suggests that sector specificities and the economic environment can explain 
internationalization strategies when the stage of development is controlled for. 
The three sector studies thus offer contrasting ideas about the motivation and modus 
operandi of internationalisation. Some Indian pharmaceutical firms might be motivated 
to emulate the technological leapfrogging achieved by US pharmaceutical producers in 
the past, but while US firms relied on international alliances Indian firms have depended 
on joint ventures and acquisitions. In the steel sector where scale economies are crucial 
to international competitiveness India and China appear to be gaining market shares 
through acquisitions but their motivations differ. In the software sector, Indian and 
Chinese firms diverge in both motivation and strategy.  
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Duysters, Jacob, Lemmens and Jintian (2008) look at two of the large 
internationalising conglomerates, the Haier group from China and the Tata group from 
India. Conglomeration is natural in the corporate evolution of many developing 
countries, although China and India have different histories in this regard.11 Many Indian 
business houses have had a long history of corporate evolution whilst Chinese groups are 
relatively young and their rapid growth in recent years is partly due to active state 
support. They point out that Haier has used a ‘walking on two legs strategy’ – on one 
hand replicating in overseas markets the innovations developed to cater for the needs of 
large domestic market and at the same time acquiring related technological expertise 
internationally in order to grow from a single-product to a multi-product company.  On 
the other hand they draw on work by Goldstein (2008) on the Tata group to show that 
Tatas have used internationalization to become more specialised in their operations and 
to increase value from a few chosen lines of business. Although the industry sectors that 
comprise the group firms are different, the paper shows that in both countries the groups 
have used globalization to exploit economies of scale and scope.  
 
4. Policy Implications 
These analyses pose a natural question: what is the economic impact of such emerging 
internationalization for China and India, and for the advanced economies that have 
served as hosts to investment flows. Relatedly, we could ask, what policy implications 
arise from our assessment of the likely impact? 
Among potential recipients of foreign direct investments from China and India, many 
developed economies have long espoused openness to inflows. Greenfield investment by 
foreign firms has been seen by many governments (especially in the UK and the EU) as a 
valuable channel for expanded investment and employment generation. Further, inward 
foreign investment may improve domestic productivity through spillovers of technology, 
through the demonstration effect of better management practices, and also because 
competition from MNEs provides stimulus for efficiency improvements in domestic 
firms.  
                         
11 Khanna and Yishay (2007) argue that this is on account of institutional voids and missing 
markets. 
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However, many Indian and Chinese multinationals have entered international markets 
through acquisitions of existing assets rather than greenfield investment. This is, of 
course, consistent with the observation that Chinese and Indian firms have fewer 
ownership advantages. However, a study by Mata and Portugal (2000) of the closure and 
divestment of 1000 foreign-owned firms that started operating in Portugal during the 
period 1983-1989 shows that the mode of entry – greenfield vs. acquisition – affects the 
longevity of the investment. They argue that greenfield investments are more asset–
specific and dependent on the ownership advantages, and likely to be more durable. In 
contrast, acquisitions often involve the purchase of a complementary but non-specific 
asset. The non-specific nature of the acquired asset results in a lower exit threshold – say, 
if international expansion plans falter or if there is a strategic re-orientation within the 
acquiring firm – and also is easier to sell to someone else. If so, it would be rational to 
find a policy preference for greenfield investment over acquisitions as the mode of entry.  
 Public reaction to these acquisitions – and the political economy behind these 
reactions – is mixed. In many cases, acquisitions have been of failing firms. Bertoni et al 
(2008) find, for instance, that Chinese acquisitions in Europe are more likely to be of 
poorly performing firms. Recent notable acquisitions by India’s Tata group include those 
of Corus and Jaguar, both firms in different degrees of financial distress. In all such 
cases, it is likely that the post-acquisition rationalization of these firms will result in 
labour retrenchment rather than employment generation. To the extent these were firms 
in distress, some retrenchment would have happened regardless of foreign takeover, but 
whether overseas firms are seen to be ‘saviours’ or ‘asset-strippers’ depends on careful 
enunciation of corporate strategy. Tata, with a credible record of successful labour 
relations are well placed to cope with this, but may yet need to tread carefully. 
The potential of productivity-enhancing spillovers from the operation of Chinese and 
Indian firms requires a more cautious assessment. As Driffield et al (2008) point out, the 
potential for technological spillovers is low when FDI inflows are technology-seeking 
rather than technology-exploiting. Nonetheless, the entry of foreign firms could well 
increase the degree of competition in the industry, with potential gain in productivity. 
Public perceptions of Chinese and Indian MNCs are inevitably tied up with reactions 
to the recent growth of these countries. While most people consider China’s success in 
low-cost manufacturing for global consumers to be a positive development, the 
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inevitable rise of China and India as significant economic players causes consternation by 
challenging the established order of industrial hegemony. Consider, the growing unease 
with the entry of large sovereign wealth funds, and the concerns that these are largely 
instruments of an overbearing Chinese state. Of course, the dominance of state-owned 
enterprises in Chinese internationalization may be structural: unlike Indian business 
houses, a poorly developed domestic capital market might imply that state sponsorship is 
critical for Chinese firms’ overseas ventures. But at the same time it creates the 
perception that these firms are beneficiaries of ‘unfair state aid’, and argument that 
resonates with old debates about strategic trade policy.  
The implications of internationalization for the home economies, that is, for China 
and India, are also subject to debate. One view expresses concern that outward FDI can 
deprive developing countries of scarce capital, including human capital in the form of 
managerial resources. This is reminiscent of early concerns about brain-drain, but a more 
balanced position has come to understand that what starts as brain drain can become a 
part of two-way ‘brain circulation’, and in any case, even if these flows are perverse, it is 
hard to control them in an increasing globalizing world. An alternatively view sees the 
emerging internationalization as the ‘coming of age’ for Chinese and Indian corporate 
sector and a measure of their ability to compete globally on equal terms. However, this 
more celebratory approach carries risks too: when competitive foreign acquisitions 
become an end in itself, they carry the risk of irrational excess. It is conceivable that 
many of the acquisitions currently being celebrated as badges of success will result in 
corporate failure, especially as the word struggles with a financial crisis that is likely to 
persist. Nonetheless, analysing the internationalization of Chinese and Indian firms 
should provide rich rewards for research, and till the process is better understood, it 
would be sensible to call for a relatively neutral policy towards their internationalization. 
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